"Optimal Experimentation Design with Secret Repetition" (with Zheng Gong)
Econometric Society European Winter Meeting 2018, Brownbag HKU (available upon request)
Abstract: We study a persuasion game with limited commitment in which a biased sender designs and conducts costly experiments to acquire information which he can conceal or reveal. The sender commits to the experiment design, but he can secretly repeat experiments and selectively report the outcomes. In the benchmark model, the optimal experiment turns out to be a one-round experiment and the sender truthfully discloses the experiment outcome. The cost of an experiment is a measure of credibility. Higher credibility leads to less informative experiment which lowers the receiver's payoff. With general payoff function of the sender, the above results remain with mild restrictions. We geometrically characterize the optimal experiment using the same concavification with Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) but within a refined belief space.
Econometric Society European Winter Meeting 2018, Brownbag HKU (available upon request)
Abstract: We study a persuasion game with limited commitment in which a biased sender designs and conducts costly experiments to acquire information which he can conceal or reveal. The sender commits to the experiment design, but he can secretly repeat experiments and selectively report the outcomes. In the benchmark model, the optimal experiment turns out to be a one-round experiment and the sender truthfully discloses the experiment outcome. The cost of an experiment is a measure of credibility. Higher credibility leads to less informative experiment which lowers the receiver's payoff. With general payoff function of the sender, the above results remain with mild restrictions. We geometrically characterize the optimal experiment using the same concavification with Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) but within a refined belief space.
"Social Discrimination and Evolution of Social Norms"
Work in progress
Abstract: This paper analyzes individual's behavior when he cares about others' perception of his group identity. I assume that both group identity and agent's intrinsic preference are private information. In equilibrium, individuals use the final behavior to signal their group identity. For example, a pessimistic financial analyst may recommend buy more frequently if he wants to be perceived as an optimistic analyst.
Work in progress
Abstract: This paper analyzes individual's behavior when he cares about others' perception of his group identity. I assume that both group identity and agent's intrinsic preference are private information. In equilibrium, individuals use the final behavior to signal their group identity. For example, a pessimistic financial analyst may recommend buy more frequently if he wants to be perceived as an optimistic analyst.