"Learning Deterrence vs. Encouragement: Seller-optimal Buyer-learning"
Abstract: This paper studies the optimal selling mechanism when an uninformed buyer can sequentially and privately acquire costly information about his valuation of a product. The seller designs the mechanism to affect the buyer's benefit from learning and thereby controls the learning process. Our main result shows that it is always sub-optimal to induce partial learning, and the optimal mechanism either encourages full learning or deters learning. Specifically, the seller optimally encourages full learning if the buyer is relatively uninformed and optimistic. Otherwise the optimal mechanism prevents learning, which benefits both the buyer and the seller.
Abstract: This paper studies the optimal selling mechanism when an uninformed buyer can sequentially and privately acquire costly information about his valuation of a product. The seller designs the mechanism to affect the buyer's benefit from learning and thereby controls the learning process. Our main result shows that it is always sub-optimal to induce partial learning, and the optimal mechanism either encourages full learning or deters learning. Specifically, the seller optimally encourages full learning if the buyer is relatively uninformed and optimistic. Otherwise the optimal mechanism prevents learning, which benefits both the buyer and the seller.
"Information Design in Cheap Talk"
Brownbag University of Toronto, Midwest Theory Conference
Abstract: An uninformed sender chooses a publicly observable experiment and sends a message to a receiver after privately learning the experimental outcome. To design the optimal experiment, the sender faces a tension between acquiring more information and alleviating the conflict of interest. In the benchmark model, the optimal experiment generates a conclusive signal (conclusive good news) about the state in which the two parties’ interests coincide. When the choice of experiment is not publicly observable and the sender cannot commit to it, an informative equilibrium exists if and only if there exists an equilibrium where the sender chooses to become perfectly informed.
Brownbag University of Toronto, Midwest Theory Conference
Abstract: An uninformed sender chooses a publicly observable experiment and sends a message to a receiver after privately learning the experimental outcome. To design the optimal experiment, the sender faces a tension between acquiring more information and alleviating the conflict of interest. In the benchmark model, the optimal experiment generates a conclusive signal (conclusive good news) about the state in which the two parties’ interests coincide. When the choice of experiment is not publicly observable and the sender cannot commit to it, an informative equilibrium exists if and only if there exists an equilibrium where the sender chooses to become perfectly informed.
"Optimal Experimentation Design with Secret Repetition" (with Zheng Gong)
ES European Winter Meeting, Brownbag University of Hong Kong, Brownbag University of Toronto (available upon request)
Abstract: We study a persuasion game with limited commitment in which a biased sender designs and conducts costly experiments to acquire information which he can conceal or reveal. The sender commits to the experiment design, but he can secretly repeat experiments and selectively report the outcomes. In the benchmark model, the optimal experiment turns out to be a one-round experiment and the sender truthfully discloses the experiment outcome. The cost of an experiment is a measure of credibility. Higher credibility leads to less informative experiment which lowers the receiver's payoff. With general payoff function of the sender, the above results remain with mild restrictions. We geometrically characterize the optimal experiment using the same concavification with Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) but within a refined belief space.
ES European Winter Meeting, Brownbag University of Hong Kong, Brownbag University of Toronto (available upon request)
Abstract: We study a persuasion game with limited commitment in which a biased sender designs and conducts costly experiments to acquire information which he can conceal or reveal. The sender commits to the experiment design, but he can secretly repeat experiments and selectively report the outcomes. In the benchmark model, the optimal experiment turns out to be a one-round experiment and the sender truthfully discloses the experiment outcome. The cost of an experiment is a measure of credibility. Higher credibility leads to less informative experiment which lowers the receiver's payoff. With general payoff function of the sender, the above results remain with mild restrictions. We geometrically characterize the optimal experiment using the same concavification with Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) but within a refined belief space.
"Right is Wrong: Term Limit and Information Transmission" (work in progress)
"Social Discrimination and Evolution of Social Norms" (work in progress)