

Alternative explanation for dual expectation

Consider a simple case where $N=2$ (result can be generated to arbitrary N) and an information structure G defined by its cutoffs $\{0, s_1, 1\}$. This information structure induces two posterior means, x_1 and x_2 . Now we construct a minorant function \underline{u} function as below,¹

$$\underline{u}(x) = \begin{cases} u(x_1) + u'(x_1)(x - x_1) & \text{if } x \in [0, s_1), \\ u(x_2) + u'(x_2)(x - x_2) & \text{if } x \in [s_1, 1]. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Therefore, $\underline{u}(x)$ is convex and is piece-wise affine. Moreover, it is tangent to $u(x)$ at each posterior mean. We want to argue that \underline{u} is also continuous at s_1 under the optimal solution, then the dual expectation such that s_1 is the conditional expectation on $[x_1, x_2)$ under the distribution u' follows from Corollary 1.

We prove by contradiction. Suppose the information structure G , characterized by the interval cutoffs $\{0, s_1, 1\}$, is optimal and the minorant function \underline{u} constructed accordingly is not continuous at s_1 , as in the left panel of Figure 1. Then consider another function \hat{u} such that,

$$\hat{u}(x) = \max\{u(x_1) + u'(x_1)(x - x_1), u(x_2) + u'(x_2)(x - x_2)\},$$

where $u(x_1) + u'(x_1)(x - x_1)$ meets $u(x_2) + u'(x_2)(x - x_2)$ at $\hat{s}_1 \in (x_1, x_2)$. See the right panel of Figure 1. Note that \hat{s}_1 exists. We also define the corresponding information structure \hat{G} , characterized by the interval partition with cutoffs $\{0, \hat{s}_1, 1\}$.

Then the following inequality holds.

$$\begin{aligned} \int u dG &= \int \underline{u} dG = \int_0^{s_1} \underline{u} dF + \int_{s_1}^1 \underline{u} dF \\ &\leq \int_0^{\hat{s}_1} \hat{u} dF + \int_{\hat{s}_1}^1 \hat{u} dF = \int \hat{u} d\hat{G} \leq \int u d\hat{G}. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The first equality is because the information structure G puts mass points at x_1 and x_2 . The second equality comes from that \underline{u} is piece-wise linear in state. The first inequality

¹In a single-agent decision problem, each line segment of \underline{u} represents the DM's payoff in state θ when he takes the optimal action $y^*(x_i)$.




Figure 1: Contradiction

in the second row comes from \hat{u} is everywhere above \underline{u} . The equality in the second row again comes from the piece-wise linearity of \hat{u} . The last inequality is because u is everywhere above \hat{u} . That is, there exists another information structure \hat{G} better than G if \underline{u} is not continuous at s_1 .²

²We thank Gregorio Curello for his inspiration of this proof.